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n this paper I argue that certain of the “new issues”
in global trade negotiations belong there quite
naturally.  I label these conformable issues “market-
supportive regulation.”  I believe that wise incor-
poration of market-supportive regulation into the
World Trade Organization (WTO) is the key to gen-
erating a new wave of “gains from trade”—and to
widely disseminating those gains within and
among societies.
I call this my thesis, for lack of an accurate,
but humbler, term.  My illustrations of market-sup-
portive regulation include a subset of principles and
practices from the domains of competition policies,
technology policies, and labor-relations policies.  
…But only a subset.  Only those regulatory
principles that conform most closely to the market
system belong on the WTO negotiating agenda.  The
rest would hold back its progress.
My thesis begs several questions.
Why the title’s emphasis on “a way forward”
in WTO negotiations?  Obviously because forward
momentum is slow, and was slow even before the
Seattle debacle.1 Less obviously, because it’s still
worth going forward for all WTO members, includ-
ing the United States.  Last and least obviously, be-
cause going forward on three speciﬁc new issues
has unappreciated value. It is a way to do two urgent-
ly needed things: To further empower the global
market system and, simultaneously, to increase its
constituency and thus enhance its broad legitimacy.
What “privileges” the market system to lead me
to recommend its further empowerment? First, I will
argue that it is a remarkable social mechanism for
reaching objectives of all kinds—necessary and noble,
individual and communal, monetary and intangible—
noncoercively.  Second, and more important, I believe
that the current market system needs an incentive
to negotiate on issues of its own legitimacy, limits,
and regulation.  Its gains from negotiating new issues,
standing side-by-side with procedural and material
gains for labor unions, technology users, and nascent
and small ﬁrms, are what make my proposed way
forward viable—because it is mutually beneﬁcial.2
Why any new issues at all?  Why not WTO busi-
ness as usual?  Why not just say no to new issues?3
I maintain that business as usual no longer is an
option.  The broad backlash against it is here to stay.
There will be no results from multilateral negotia-
tions this way, no chance to enjoy the new gains
from global integration without some broadening
of the beneﬁciary base beyond business as usual.
Why the WTO for my proposal—there are alter-
native forums and mechanisms?  Part of my answer
is that the WTO already oversees a market-supportive
body of regulations; indeed that is its main purpose.
Another part of my answer is that the WTO has already
started implementing market-supportive new issues
in the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
Agreement, and in telecommunications and other
services.  The last part of my answer is that alterna-
tive forums have proved incapable of handling new
issues effectively (e.g., the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development on investment) and
unable to broaden the constituency of beneﬁciaries
(e.g., the North American Free Trade Area’s failed
attempt to draw in labor and environmental com-
munities).
I begin below with a very brief discussion of what’s
to be gained in a new round of WTO negotiations.
In Section 3, I describe what I mean by market-
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tive bargaining.  See Walton and McKersie (1965).
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supportive regulation, illustrating it in Sections 4,
5, and 6 by competition, technology, and labor poli-
cies. I ﬁnish with brief discussions of how the WTO
might practically incorporate the market-supportive
new issues and why domestic political constituen-
cies might come to support their incorporation
into the WTO.4
WHAT’S AT STAKE
Traditional estimates of the gains from more trade
liberalization are notoriously modest.5 But most
traditional studies assume away striking gains that
new research reveals.6 These non-traditional gains
include effects on growth, technology, productivity,
market power, and best-practice benchmarks (as well as
tighter industry dispersion around these benchmarks).
Much of this new research has been carried out at
the industrial grass roots—ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm, establish-
ment-by-establishment, shop-ﬂoor-by-shop-ﬂoor.
Traditional ambiguities caused by over-aggregated
measures have been reduced.
The new research suggests sizeable gains to further
global liberalization, even for relatively open countries
like the United States.  These gains are of many kinds—
gains from trade in goods and services due to stronger
export engagement and deeper import dependence,
and from inward and outward investment and techno-
logy transfer.
Global integration of all kinds seems vital for
superior economic performance.  American workers,
ﬁrms, and communities with lots of exports, imports,
overseas licensing and supplier relationships, invest-
ment abroad, and foreign investment at home pros-
per compared to their insular counterparts.
There’s still a lot at stake.
MARKET-SUPPORTIVE REGULATION
AND THE MARKET SYSTEM
Market-supportive regulations are those that
make the market system more effective, stable, and
sustainable.  But the terms in this brief statement
need elaboration.
What is called the “market system” is a peculiar
mix of competition and cooperation.  Everyone is
familiar with the competition.  But few reﬂect very
deeply on the cooperation.  Almost all the agents
that compete are social groupings, whose internal
organization is for the most part cooperative, not
competitive.  “Firm” is the generic term for these
agents—corporations, partnerships, labor unions,
not-for-proﬁts, and others.  
Firms are both the suppliers of most products
and services and also the principal buyers.  House-
holds, who also are cooperative social agents, are
generally buyers only of ﬁnal goods as consumers.
These ﬁnal goods are assembled from materials and
components that have already been bought and
sold many times by ﬁrms, through a long series of
exchanges in both input markets and in internal,
intraﬁrm transactions.  The market system is a com-
plex, vertical, and  social network of purchases and
sales, contracts and conventions among ﬁrms.  The
market system is itself a mix of competition and
cooperation, a social organism.  The quality of the
organism’s competition and cooperation determines
how effectively and efﬁciently it combines funda-
mental inputs such as worker services to produce
ﬁnal goods and services for those very workers.
In simple terms, the quality of this social market
system determines the standard of living of its workers.
So the prototypical “economic man/woman” so
common in elementary textbooks is really a stylized
ﬁction; so, too, the mythical individual entrepreneur.
Typical real market transactions involve competition
and cooperation in a complex sequence among inter-
nally cooperative social groups.  The internal coop-
eration is governed by such regulations as company
law; the external competition and cooperation by such
regulations as contract law and competition (antitrust)
policy.  Many of the market’s social groups have legal
status that grants them the right to collectively own
and exchange property, including intangible prop-
erty (e.g., intellectual property) and licenses (e.g., to
represent a set of workers), and to differentiate and
isolate their legal liability as group members from
their liability as individuals.
Thus, the market system is socially populated,
socially rooted, socially conditioned, and socially
constructed.  It is far, far away from the chaotically
competitive “law of the jungle” with which it is
sometimes rhetorically confused.  
I will argue that, correspondingly, a sustainable
global market system will be socially constructed
and conditioned, too, by policy design.
Economic regulations condition this competi-
tive-cooperative market system.  Among other goals,
4 I intend to draft a more detailed defense of my thesis, to be published
by the Institute for International economics.
5 The conference paper by Hertel illustrates this point.
6 This new research is surveyed most directly in Richardson (2000) and
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Designed properly, they are market-supportive7 and
part of the social infrastructure.8 They regulate the
intensity of competition, the scope of cooperation,
and deﬁne the due processes and legal boundaries
for both, including the important boundary between
coercive and voluntary transactions.  For one exam-
ple, company law supports the market for corpor-
ate control; it establishes categories of voting rights
and procedures for shareholders, and determines
when and how a rival ﬁrm’s managers can compete
for the shareholders’ allegiance (cooperation).  For
a second example, labor-relations law supports the
market for cooperative representation—agency; it
establishes workplace voting procedures for workers
to be represented collectively by a union and when
and how another union could compete for certiﬁ-
cation to organize the workers cooperatively.  For a
third example, intellectual-property law aims to
undergird the markets for artistic creation and pro-
ductive innovation, indirectly compensating for exter-
nalities and for missing inter-generational markets.
Not all economic regulations are market-sup-
portive.  Some are market-inhibiting—though often
“for a good cause” (e.g., prohibitions on markets in
socially dangerous goods and services, or limitations
on current markets to avoid extinction of future
markets, as in ﬁsheries regulation). Environmental
regulations are often of this sort.  Though I leave
them outside my own set of illustrations of market-
supportive regulation, they need not be left out.  In
market-supportive variants, environmental regula-
tions aim to create and reﬁne markets—markets for
spillovers that are otherwise nonmarketable (exter-
nalities), and markets for intergenerational trans-
actions that are infeasible without devices to repre-
sent the preferences and objectives of the unborn.9
Still other regulations are distant from markets.
Social regulation10 often is motivated by nonmaterial
values and needs.  Voting regulations, systems of
education, criminal justice, national military service,
and social-welfare and human-rights policies are all
social regulations that are all less directly supportive
of markets than the economic regulations above.
Social regulations are important— vitally important—
but they are not promising issues for impending
negotiations that should aim to realize the large
gains from further integration of global markets.
Social regulations are too distant, too diversionary,
not sufﬁciently conformable, and orthogonal.1 1
I want to argue, in the rest of this paper, that
three kinds of limited, market-supportive economic
regulations are natural companions to global mar-




Market-supportive competition policies are one
of the best examples of regulation that conforms to
the fundamental purposes of the WTO and that
belongs under its umbrella.  Multilateral trade nego-
tiations and competition policies usually have very
similar objectives.  The aim of both is more open
market organization of economic activity.12 Open-
ness connotes freedom of entry and contestability
(deﬁned below).
I believe that the time is ripe for multilateral
WTO negotiations over “conditions of competition”—
though they will take a long time to reach fruition
and must properly begin in a very modest, proce-
dural way.  In previous writings, Edward M. Graham
and I13 have recommended that ﬁrst-generation ini-
tiatives include only the gradual commitment of all
WTO members to implementing a baseline set of
domestic competition policies14 concerning cartel
practices and anti-competitive horizontal restrictions,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
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World Bank, 1997; Holmes and Sunstein, 1999; for example), though
generally submerged by alarmist, populist accounts of the war between
greed and governance.  Garrett (1998, pp. 789ff.), for example, describes
the potential for a “virtuous circle between activist government and
international openness.”
9 See Noll (1997) for further discussion.  Esty (1994) is still the best trea-
tise on how environmental regulations could be negotiated globally in
a WTO-like GEO (Global Environmental Organization).
10See Noll (1997) for a recent articulation of the traditional distinction
between social and economic regulation, along with a thoughtful dis-
cussion of the differing international implications of regulatory reform
in the two cases.
11See Nivola (1997).  Rodrik (1997), Ch. 5, by contrast, is willing to enter-
tain careful inclusion of some social regulation in trade negotiations.
He labels this the “social safeguards” approach.
12By contrast, bilateral and regional negotiations often have many other
objectives, from coalition-building to regional security.
13See Richardson (1998a,b) and a series of papers brought together in
Graham and Richardson (1997a,b).  Other contributions include Graham
(1994, 1995, 1996, 1998), Graham and Lawrence (1996), Graham and
Richardson (1999), and Richardson (1995, 1997, 1999).
14The number of countries implementing a formal competition policy in recent
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and creating guidelines for merger and acquisition.
These baseline policies would be notiﬁed to the
WTO, which would also oversee a process of consul-
tations, but initially not formal dispute settlement.
To emphasize its modest, though market-supportive
goals, we have characterized this phase as “cooper-
ative unilateralism.”
Only in a second phase did we imagine a com-
mitment to negotiate a Trade-Related Antitrust
Measures (TRAMs) Agreement and to bring normal
dispute settlement to bear.  The agenda for such
second-phase negotiations is the same set of base-
line practices as countries have taken on in the ﬁrst
phase, all aimed at “contestability.”  Contestability
denotes the right to compete for market access by
exporters, foreign investors (who would receive
national treatment, with limited exceptions), and
small and new home suppliers alike.15 These groups
are the beneﬁciaries and constituents of the TRAMs
Agreement that we foresee and recommend.16
Indeed Graham and I have argued that a “con-
ditions-of-competition” WTO agenda is becoming
more and more natural and increasingly necessary.
The concerns and ambiance of trade negotiation
and grievance are rapidly changing. Concessions
that concern regulatory practice pervade recent
negotiations over insurance, intellectual property,
telecommunications services, and trade-related
investment measures.  Contentions over industrial
policies lie ahead in ﬁnancial services, information
technology, electronic commerce, agriculture, and
technology-related investment requirements.  Fun-
damental disagreement about what government is
and who its regulators represent will make bargain-
ing over procurement and labor relations thorny.
Chinese and Russian accession to the World Trade
Organization—or not—will ultimately rest on bar-
gaining over internal accessibility policies, not
border measures.
Social conditions of competition are the com-
mon theme in all these new concerns and ambi-
ance.  Who may compete with whom?  Or displace
them, or absorb them?  Under what contingencies?
With what kinds of government support?17 Using
what processes, technology, contractual practices,
employment relations?
But why the WTO?  An important reason is that
WTO-sponsored liberalization in key sectors such
as services, telecommunications, and information
technology will be the principal proving ground for
how contestable global markets really are.18 A
second reason is that baseline competition-policy
commitments by large, would-be members of the
WTO, especially China and Russia, will solidify the
organization; without such commitments, all the
more traditional WTO conventions “at the border”
will be undermined seriously by private practices
behind it. (China, for example, does not even prac-
tice internal, inter-regional freedom of trade.)  A
third reason is that the adoption of core competition
policies in all WTO members helps to ease each
member’s transition toward more open borders.
Enhancing internal contestability helps rationalize
a country’s internal market structure, allowing the
fittest ﬁrms to prosper, absorbing weaker ﬁrms, and
thereby making it easier to cope with additional pres-
sures from freer trade and investment.  A fourth rea-
son is that baseline competition policies protect an
economy from the worst abuses of other policies
that support markets by protecting technological
property rights, policies to which we turn next.
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15Contestability is not the same as market access, as usually described
in trade negotiations.  As a right to compete, contestability is more
akin to the idea of market accessibility.  The reason for these distinc-
tions is that every conception of market access involves a measure-
ment.  Virtually every measurement of market access involves a
market share or sales quota, anathema to antitrust and to the WTO.
Undue focus on market access leads dangerously toward the capture
of competition policy by industrial-policy advocates and other special
interests. Wolff (1997, 1999), Howell (1998), and Wolff et al. (1998),
for example, all conﬂate market access and accessibility.  Antitrust
specialists keep them distinct, for example in the counsel to “defend
competition, but not any given competitors.”  Market accessibility can
be evaluated by all the new antitrust tests of entry barriers and fore-
closure: effects of anti-competitive practices on prices; on competi-
tion upstream, downstream, and in adjacent regions and products; on
the sunk costs of entry; and on the range of desirable attributes of a
product or service.
16Assuming satisfactory performance at this second stage, our third
stage (TRAMs-plus) would extend the coverage to more controversial
issues, including vertical practices and competition-policy safeguards—
exemptions for industries that are downsizing  The second and third
stages of our proposal might be phased in at different rates by dif-
ferent member groups, as in the case of TRIPs.
17European practice includes such government support (“state aids”) as
a competition policy issue.
18The WTO is not the only multilateral forum in which integration of
competition, trade, and investment policies could be pursued.  Never-
theless, we conclude from our research, as does Brittan (1997) and
Van Miert (1998), that the WTO is ideally poised to achieve the requi-
site capability.  The TRIPs Agreement and those on ﬁnancial services,
basic telecommunications, and other services will inevitably change
the character of WTO proceedings in the direction of professional and
regulatory expertise and information-provision.  This is exactly the
direction of change necessary to undertake our proposals.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
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MARKET-SUPPORTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY POLICIES
Some market-supportive technology regulations
already have been on the WTO negotiating table.
Those protecting intellectual technological property
have recently been rationalized and codiﬁed in the
TRIPs (Trade-Related Intellectual Property) Agree-
ment of the WTO.19 How successful has the
experience been so far?  How well does it support
my thesis?  Are there other market-supportive tech-
nology policies that belong in the small set that I
would deﬁne as market-supportive.  My answers to
the ﬁrst two questions, relying heavily on Maskus
(2000a, 2000b), are “reasonably successful so far”
and “reasonably strong support for my thesis.”  
My answer to the third is that there is more to
negotiate, especially in supporting the markets 
for distributing technology.
Like competition policies, market-supportive
technology policies conform well to the fundamental
purposes of the WTO.  At a basic level, technology is
information.20 Reasonably complete, diffuse informa-
tion is a precondition for markets to work well—effec-
tively, fairly, with minimal discrimination.  These three
are virtually the same desiderata as the WTO pursues
for global markets.  Market-supportive information is
the reason that the WTO insists on detailed, accurate
notiﬁcation of policies by every member country (an
unsung requirement and beneﬁt of membership).
Markets work anyway, of course, in environ-
ments with imperfect or asymmetric information.
But, they don’t necessarily work well. A large micro-
economics literature has shown this over the past
twenty years.  Imperfectly informed markets some-
times waste resources; they sometimes leave capable
buyers isolated (rationed by discrimination); they
sometimes violate the market system’s self-imposed
limitation to voluntary, noncoercive transactions. 
• Somewhat rhetorically, it is worth observing
that even economists don’t believe in the
merits of the completely free market for used
cars and homes when their sellers know all
the problems and their buyers do not.  Buyer
protection regulation, compulsory warranties,
and legislation against fraud all help those
markets work better.   
• Closer to home in this paper, few economists
automatically defend the free market for
genetically modiﬁed organisms, when at least
some of them may be marketed by copy-cat
or grey-market sellers who do not themselves
know all the cautionary conditions and risks
in producing and using such biotechnologies.
This market, too, would work better with some
sort of compulsory (global?) warranty and user-
protection regulation.
The examples clearly suggest the awkwardness
of calling uninformed “voluntary” transactions vol-
untary at all.  And if  “coercive” isn’t quite the right
word either, perhaps “exploitative” is, connoting
the power of information advantage.  
I believe that imperfectly informed markets need
regulatory support before they can become properly
defensible, and that this also is true globally.
The view that technology is basically informa-
tion signals very clearly that technology is both a
private good (an input), and a public good.  Maskus
(2000b, Ch. 3), for example, conceives of
intellectual property rights (IPRs) as “fundamental
inputs ... public inputs ... public infrastructural
investments.”  
Identifying technological IPRs as distinctive
private inputs is helpful for explaining why pro-
duction and distribution of the technologies being
protected is so important to the market system,
qualitatively and quantitatively.21 Identifying IPRs
as public inputs raises immediately the public-goods
problem of whether markets generate enough pro-
duction and enough distribution of technology.
The traditional answers are: no, not enough produc-
tion, as for any public good whose value is nondi-
minishable and whose exclusion devices are infea-
sible or prohibitively costly;22 and no, not enough
distribution, because those exclusion devices that
remain feasible to protect producers’ incentives also
screen out users whose valuation of the technology
exceeds its marginal cost.
19I have in mind those parts of the TRIPs Agreement concerning patents,
integrated circuits, and trade secrets (distinctive ways that a ﬁrm oper-
ates that have unique commercial value).  The sections on copyrights
and trademarks are less supportive of technology as I mean it.
20Technology-as-information is sometimes discernible in the details of
a process innovation, other times in the physical details of a product
innovation.
21Romer (1994) shows that the beneﬁts (to a developing country, no less)
from being able to import unique inputs, embodying new technology,
are presumptively many times larger (20 times larger is his central
calculation) than traditional calculations of the gains from trade.  See
also Lawrence and Weinstein (1999), who ﬁnd evidence that imported
inputs contributed importantly to Japanese and Korean productivity
growth.  See also Katz (1987).
22Nondiminishability means that one agent’s use does not reduce the
amount of information left over for other agents to use.  Nonexclud-
ability is the extreme property that makes it impossible to isolate agents
who are unwilling to contribute to paying for the new information.120 JULY/AUGUST 2000
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P olicies and institutions that best support mar-
kets for technological innovation are controversial.23
They are controversial when private goods alone
are in question.  They are even more controversial
for public goods.  But simple intuition helps inform
the controversy.  The intuition is that because public
goods have uniquely nondiminishable and nonex-
cludable properties, policies for supporting distribu-
tion markets will have even greater importance rel-
ative to production markets than for private goods.
Encouraging extra distribution that is compensated
at (marginal) cost creates no extra scarcity, and
rations no unlucky users.
With respect to intellectual property itself, I
believe the time is ripe for signiﬁcant, balance-ori-
ented refinement of the TRIPs Agreement.  My
general reading is that the existing agreement is a
good start at supporting the market for producing
new information, new ideas, and new technologies,
but that ongoing TRIPs negotiations should more
strongly support the market for distribution.  The
existing TRIPs Agreement has focused more on
generation than dissemination, more on supporting
the market to produce innovation and less on sup-
porting the business-to-business “retail market” for
technology users and traders.  The two markets are
very different, the agents (constituents) involved are
very different, just as they are for electricity gener-
ation and distribution.24
Suppose that one grants that the technology dis-
tribution goal is clear and market-supportive.  Still, the
best practical sequence of steps to approach this goal
is controversial.  This suggests again a cautious, multi-
stage negotiation.  Caution might feature standstill on
certain unﬁnished technology-production issues and
experimentation on selected technology-distribution
issues.  In addition to TRIPs, several elements of ex-
perimentation might involve the WTO’s Trade-Related
Investment Measures (TRIMs) Agreement.
Speciﬁcally, I propose two families of market-
supportive TRIPs and TRIMs modiﬁcations: market
facilitation measures and forbearance/standstill on
controversial carry-over issues.
1.  Facilitation. There has been little formal-
ization of the technical and ﬁnancial assistance
provision of the TRIPs Agreement (Part VII).  New
adopters of TRIPs regimens have been loathe to
pay their own administrative set-up costs, especially
when short-term forecasts have these countries
together paying out up to $5 billion annually in
royalties and fees to IP-abundant countries.25 Esti-
mates of administrative costs are surprisingly low,
however—roughly $1 million/year for Bangladesh,
Chile, Egypt (Maskus, 2000b, Ch. 4).   A market-
supportive way to cover up-front administrative
ﬁxed costs is to ﬁnance them by loans.  The loans
could then be serviced out of transitional facilita-
tion fees on cross-border royalties paid for host-
country IP protection.26 Such an arrangement facil-
itates and ﬁnances mutually beneﬁcial technical
assistance.  It is not foreign aid.  It should be con-
ceived as rent-reinvestment rather than rent-shift-
ing. It could be tactically implemented by Patent
Ofﬁces and by public-private consortia, rather than
by diplomatic agencies.  It would create natural
forums for negotiating licensing and follow-on
innovation, which aid in both the production and
distribution of technology.
2.  Forbearance. The current TRIPs Agreement
preserves a great deal of national discretion (sover-
eignty).  For example, there is national discretion
on implementation deﬁnitions and procedures,27
publishing conventions for patents, exemptions
(e.g., for plant breeding, health-related and other
noncommercial research, environmental and
species preservation, noncommercial use), and
treatment of parallel imports.  Parallel imports are
“goods brought into a country without the authoriza-
tion of the patent, trademark, or copyright holder
after those goods were placed legitimately into 
circulation elsewhere” (Maskus, 2000b, Ch. 4).28
23Answers for tangible goods always have differed from answers for 
creative and artistic services (patents vs. copyright, for example, or
bio-patents vs. others).  “Best” is sometimes identiﬁed with notions 
of “dynamic efﬁciency.”
24See a discussion of similar issues in electricity regulation in the
Economic Report of the President (1999), Ch. 5, pp. 211-18.
25Maskus (2000b), Table 4.2, citing work by McCalman (1999). These
can be construed as short-run proﬁt transfers in light of Smith’s
(1999) ﬁndings that the enhanced market-power of IP owners, which
distorts markets, dominates the market-expansion effects of stronger
IP protection and the cost-savings from reduced anti-piracy with
respect to U.S. trade.
26Such a fee would be essentially a temporary tariff, possibly degressive,
on services’ imports of IP.  Tariff revenues would service the loans that
ﬁnanced the implementation of TRIPs in the importing country.
27Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement leaves countries discretion to set
“working requirements” (Maskus, 2000b, Ch. 4; Watal, 1998).
28Virtually no poorer countries regulate parallel imports.  This allows
them as pure buyers to “shop for technology” from the cheapest source.
The United States, as an important technology producer, restricts par-
allel imports to preserve the appropriate dynamic incentive (reward)
for U.S. innovators.  The European Union adopts a halfway house
between innovation incentives and free trade, banning parallel im-
ports from outside its membership, but allowing them from within
for the sake of the “single market.”JULY/AUGUST 2000    121
Such discretion has surprising market value in cul-
tures and environments where the very idea of prop-
erty rights to technology is new.  It allows experi-
mentation with different standards and regulatory
competition among them, in essence “innovation”
in the procedures of IP protection.  Considerations
like these suggest the value of regularizing such
status-quo discretion, at least for a time, rather than
pushing ahead with deeper, tighter TRIPs commit-
ments along the technology-production lines empha-
sized in the existing TRIPs Agreement.29
Technology aspects of the current TRIMs Agree-
ment also might beneﬁt from the preservation of
national discretion (sovereignty).  In particular,
technology-transfer performance requirements on
inward investors were not banned by the TRIMs
Agreement.30 Preserving a country’s ability to re-
quire technology transfer by inward investors—a
ban on any future TRIMs ban—arguably is suppor-
tive of the market for distributing technology.31
Unlike other performance requirements, these may
pay off in host countries.32 Among other reasons,
technology transfer performance requirements
force commercial negotiations over licensing, with-
out dictating its terms.  Otherwise anti-competi-
tive, anti-market “refusal to deal” can become
entrenched.  Many technologies are, in essence,
akin to essential facilities in the competition poli-
cies that govern transportation and telecommu-
nications markets.33 And in such cases “negoti-
ated compulsion” is a familiar tool of competition
authorities (e.g., compulsory divestiture, cease-and-
desist orders, consent decrees over licensing34) and
of buyer-protection agencies (e.g., compulsory war-
ranties, truth in advertising).
But why the WTO?  The most obvious reason
is that the WTO already has committed to incorpo-
rating technology policies, not only in TRIPs and
TRIMs, but also in the two negotiated Information
Technology Agreements, and maybe in coming 
E-commerce protocols.  A less obvious reason is
that if the WTO gradually incorporates a subset com-
petition policy commitments, then it almost surely
has to reﬁne its technology agreements.   Perspec-
tive and practice on how competition policies need
to be different, if at all, for technology-intensive
activities, is still being worked out.35 But the fron-
tier of critical thinking in this area is clearly the
tension between protecting the incentives to inno-
vate and encouraging the distribution of its fruits.
A ﬁnal, but no less important reason, is that by
undertaking technology commitments along the
distribution-oriented lines sketched above, the WTO
pulls technology users into the group of beneﬁcia-
ries from global integration and broadens its support
base beyond the usual well-heeled suspects!
MARKET-SUPPORTIVE LABOR 
POLICIES
WTO agreement on market-supportive labor
regulations is the most radical—and the most spec-
ulative—aspect of my thesis.  It would encompass
only a subset of the familiar core labor principles,
speciﬁcally those concerning freedom of association
and collective bargaining.36 It belongs in the WTO
because it is basically a proposal for liberalization
of trade in services—worker agency services—
the market services of agency that worker organ- 
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29The one exception to such discretionary forbearance might be a dis-
tribution-encouraging agreement disciplining parallel imports of pub-
lic-health-related products and technologies, as endorsed by Maskus
(2000a, 2000b).  Such an agreement would allow some international
price discrimination in relevant pharmaceuticals and related products,
and discipline the arbitrage that sometimes undermines it.  Lower
prices in poor countries with signiﬁcant public health needs would be
offset by higher prices in richer countries.  The result would be to
support and expand markets to include users willing/able to pay only
the marginal cost of public-health-related goods.   
30It banned performance requirements covering compulsory local content
and trade-balancing and foreign-exchange-balancing requirements
(Schott and Burman, 1994, pp. 112-13).
31As a technology-production parallel and precedent, the WTO’s Subsidies
Code does not discipline research and development subsidies as harsh-
ly as it disciplines other subsidies.
32Moran (1998, 2000) argues persuasively that investor performance
requirements for local content or joint ventures actually inhibit the
global dissemination of technology. He also is critical of export and
technology-transfer requirements, but not as persuasively.  Export
performance requirements, in fact, often serve as internal host-coun-
try antidotes to foreign investors negotiating exclusive, privileged,
anti-competitive local market power (e.g., exclusive rights to supply).
33See Hausman and Sidak (1999) for a recent treatment of the related
idea that mandated  unbundling of the different elements of a tele-
communications network is pro-competitive.  Process technologies
especially often can be unbundled from other productive inputs and
sold separately (licensed out).
34For example, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission recently negotiated a
consent decree with Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz in which they agreed to
license technology and patents to a viable rival (with compensation)
as a condition of FTC approval of their merger (Economic Report of the
President, 1999, pp. 180-81).
35Gilbert and Shapiro (1997) and Economic Report of the President,
(1999), Ch. 5.
36Likewise an American authorization of fast track might include only
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REVIEW
izations and labor unions ideally provide.37 It
therefore falls sensibly under the rubric of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  Under
my proposal, the International Labor Organization
would remain the forum for discussion of and com-
mitment to broader labor-market principles.
In Elliott and Richardson (2001), my colleague
Kim Elliott and I evaluate, then endorse,  open trade
in worker agency services.  We see it as entirely
conformable to the WTO’s endorsement of open
trade in other services.  We understand such worker
agency services to encompass primarily: 
• Collective representation and bargaining over
wages, beneﬁts, and working conditions; 
• Workplace safety monitoring; 
• Grievance and dispute settlement; 
• Training, apprenticeship, and employee
assistance; 
• Financial counsel (e.g., for pensions) and man-
agement of other beneﬁts (e.g., child care).  
We emphasize the market-supportive character
of these services because they: 
• Alleviate market failures associated with col-
lective action problems, workplace public
goods,38 imperfect information, and rela-
tionship-speciﬁc assets (relationship-speciﬁc
assets are essentially what a ﬁrm’s incumbent
workers provide);39
• Discipline practices that border on coercion
(recall that the market system pre-supposes
voluntarism);40
• Create countervailing market power to the
anti-competitive market power of ﬁrms.
When entry and accessibility are present, that
is, when alternative local and global suppliers can
contest the right to represent workers as agents, they
perfect the market for such services.  They enhance
their quality and variety, encourage innovation in
worker agency services, and lower their cost.
We foresee the same sort of gains from trade in
worker agency services as exist for other agency ser-
vices. Trade in accounting and legal services provides
agency for users of information about firms (e.g.,
investors in them).  Trade in distribution services
provides enhanced agency for producers.  Trade
in brokerage and underwriting provides enhanced
agency for borrowers, entrepreneurs, and innovators.
To be more precise, after a “cooperatively
unilateral” ﬁrst stage, we envision a Trade-related
Worker Agency Services (TWAS) Agreement cover-
ing freedom of association and the right to collec-
tive bargaining, including designated activities
and/or sectors in which national treatment would
be offered to foreign worker organizations.  Only
after sufﬁcient success in implementing this sec-
ond stage would we propose widely cross-sectoral
rights of establishment and national treatment for
foreign worker organizations, subject only to nego-
tiated exceptions.41
In the “cooperatively unilateral” first stage,
national discretion would be virtually unaffected—
subject only to the commitment to implement base-
line freedom of association and collective-bargain-
ing, to notify these commitments to the WTO as
well as the ITO, and to submit to the kind of (non-
binding) mediation, not dispute settlement fea-
tured above in the ﬁrst phase of market-supportive
competition-policy commitments.  Formal dispute
settlement would be introduced only in the second-
stage TWAS Agreement, which would be modeled
on services commitments under the GATS.
Restricting multilateral labor codes to just these
market-supportive aspects—freedom of association
37See, for example, Stiglitz (2000), Part II.  Pencavel (1991) is the most
comprehensive treatment I know of labor unions as agents for their
worker/principals, though he restricts his attention only to their wage,
hours, and employment effects.  See also Freeman and Medoff (1984)
and Freeman and Kleiner (1990).
38Workplace public goods are deﬁned by Pencavel (1991, p. 6) as the
unwritten rules and conventions that are too costly to write down in
detail, and that beneﬁt workers (and often employers) in a nonexclud-
able, nonrival way.
39Contractual relationships often add economic value to the intrinsic
value of whatever assets the contracting agents bring to the relation-
ship.  But once negotiated, contracts may be costly to break.  In that
case there is an incentive created for each agent, through opportunis-
tic behavior, to tilt the distribution of the extra value in their favor.
This is called the “hold-up” problem.  Such opportunism, almost
always present in contracts covering relation-speciﬁc assets, is more
than a distributional question; it causes inefﬁciency in the form of
under-investment in all relation-speciﬁc assets, including the employ-
ment relationship.  On the general issues, see, for example Besanko,
Dranove, and Shanley (1996), pp. 110-21.  On their application to
employment relationships, see Stiglitz (2000), pp. 16 passim.
40For example, freedom of association and collective bargaining auto-
matically deﬁne and discipline some forms of forced labor.  (They also
will typically mitigate some forms of employment discrimination, such
as age-ism). Other forms of coerced labor may be more effectively
approached by ILO/WTO-coordinated negotiation, however, such as
coercive child labor, which might best be conceived as parallel to the
WTO’s existing Article XXe discretion to block trade in goods made by
prison labor.
41We imagine such rights of establishment and national treatment to be
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and collective bargaining—leaves a great deal of
scope for both distinctive national labor-relations
law and for ILO initiatives to set and publicize best-
practice standards.  Countries would have consider-
able ﬂexibility, especially in the ﬁrst stage, to regu-
late the locus of collective bargaining (plant, ﬁrm,
industry, country); to determine conditions for
strikes (sectoral restrictions, arbitration/mediation
rules, worker-replacement strictures, etc.).  It also
leaves scope for subsequent extension to labor issues
that are more social than market-supportive, such
as regulation of permissible working hours and
ages and discrimination.
Our vision inevitably involves more than the
traditional amount of competition among unions,
and opens labor relations to cross-border competi-
tion, too.  But, it does not disparage traditional
worker solidarity.  In fact, it emphasizes the fact
that some unions serve their combined membership
better than others (with fewer internal inefﬁciencies
or political diversions, and less corruption).  It also
emphasizes global worker solidarity—similar workers
worldwide can collectively and globally modulate
the competition among themselves in the same
way that unionized workers in a single plant or
ﬁrm do.
But why the WTO?  The most important reason
is that our proposed arrangements for trade in worker
agency services are market supportive, market-
opening, and indistinguishable from GATS protocols
for other services.  They open trade in labor agency
services to new entrants (incumbents already include
expert consultancies, temporary-labor ﬁrms, con-
struction companies, and so on)—speciﬁcally to
traditional unions who are rethinking their objec-
tives and economic roles under the heading “new
unionism.”  Finally, certain familiar issues in labor
relations such as contract compliance and certiﬁ-
cation/decertiﬁcation have natural analogs in com-
petition policy.  We envision that a WTO competi-
tion-policy agreement could in at least several aspects
be tailored to protect open and transparent compe-
tition to represent workers.
Critics, of course, will have much to say about
the detail of this proposal.  But they may have even
more to say about its apparent fundamental weak-
ness.  “Unions just aren’t like that.”  My answer is,
“Maybe some are not, but they should be.”  Labor
unions admittedly depart from market-supportive
ideals, but so do ﬁrms.  Mundane political objec-
tives of labor unions can often conﬂict with market
objectives (wages, beneﬁts, working conditions),
but mundane political objectives of ﬁrms similarly
compete with their market objectives.42 Labor
unions can be undemocratic, but so can ﬁrms (e.g.,
in voting vs. nonvoting shares and in rights of minor-
ity shareholders).  Labor unions can be corrupt, but
so can ﬁrms.43
WHERE THE LOCAL POLITICAL
SUPPORT LIES
In democracies, no good idea is ever adopted
without political support.  Where would local political
support come from for the thesis of this paper, were
it to be deemed a “good” idea? At ﬁrst, the answer
seems to vary with a country’s standard of living.
Where would the local political support come
from in richer countries?
Not from the usual suspects.  That would be
looking for love in all the wrong places.  The tradi-
tional private-sector trade community is skeptical
about global competition policies, lukewarm toward
information dissemination, and downright opposed
to the global adoption of any core labor rights.  At
least for the moment ....
• But, small business ought to recognize the
value of baseline competition-policy protec-
tion in foreign markets.
• But, educators and farmers and hospitals
ought to recognize the value of baseline poli-
cies that facilitate distribution of technology.
• But, workers and their unions ought to rec-
ognize the value of multilateral support for
the global association and bargaining rights
that put them on the same footing as corpo-
rate owners of tangible and intellectual prop-
erty rights.
• And, if small businesses, socially-oriented
agencies, workers, and unions are not seeing
any signiﬁcant gains for themselves from fur-
ther globalization of the traditional, naked kind,
can anyone really blame them for thinking that
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42See Pencavel (1998), pp. 30-40.  For example, ﬁrms, like unions, can
divert enormous resources from market activities to support political
parties, candidates, and regulatory agencies whose decisions will guar-
antee the ﬁrms political access and political security.  See Grossman
and Helpman (1994).  For an account of labor agents’ potential con-
structive political role in modulating globalization, deregulation, and
reform, see Freeman (1993), Section III and Stiglitz (2000), Part III.
43And unions, in several well-publicized cases (e.g., Poland), have been
strong promoters of democracy, which in turn disciplines corruption
(Elliott (1997)) and supports markets.124 JULY/AUGUST 2000
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multilateral liberalization serves only the proﬁt-
minded, capitalist owners of big business?
And where would the local political support
come from in poorer countries? 
Not from corrupt elites. They will realize that
their power is undermined by open markets—open
markets that are sought by competition policy and
that are enhanced by worker-oriented competition
among unions and other labor agents.  They will
realize that their power also is undermined by the
security of all kinds of property rights, including
those to develop and fairly apply innovation and
those to represent workers collectively.
But honest ﬁrms, and honest unions, and tech-
nology users—no matter how poor—are all potential
gainers from these initiatives.
So perhaps the answer to where the local polit-
ical support lies does not vary across countries after
all.  Perhaps it can be summarized very crisply.
Everywhere it comes from the “margin”—the margin
of persons and groups on the outer edge of gains
from the narrow, naked globalization of commerce
alone.  If, by contrast, the market system—as I have
described it—is what is on the WTO’s negotiating
table, are there not gains for large masses? And as
long as regulations are what I have called market-
supportive, might not even commercial interests
end up gaining, too, after all?
Surely there’s more promise in positive WTO-
based momentum than the trickle-down of rising
tides, either within a country or among them!
CONCLUSION
I am persuaded that the WTO’s incorporation
of a limited set of market-supportive new issues
would unleash large mutual gains to a broad
constituency of businesses, worker groups, and
others, and clear the way for more legitimate and
more sweeping global market integration in the
new millennium.
And to be completely clear about it, my propo-
sal for sequentially embodying market-supportive
new issues in the coming WTO negotiations is dif-
ferent from two others that aim at somewhat the
same outcome.  One is the stance of real politique—
concede new issues to buy off the opponents of
further global integration—“feed the trade sharks”
as one commentator put it.44 The second is the
populist stance of stakeholder economics, that
somehow everyone has a civil or human right to
voice or ownership in market institutions—there-
fore, new constituencies have a natural democratic
right to be at the commercial negotiating table with
their new issues.  
My problem with the ﬁrst is that it is too crass,
and yields too quickly to the near-zero-sum practice
of tossing lesser bones to rival dogs.  My problem
with the second is its fundamental misunderstand-
ing of both democracy and the way that it has made
itself prosperous by ceding conditional and exclu-
sionary property rights to social market institutions.
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